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New Evidence on Mutual Fund Performance: A Comparison of Alternative 
Bootstrap Methods 
 
Abstract 
We compare two bootstrap methods for assessing mutual fund performance. The first 
produces narrow confidence intervals due to pooling over time, while the second produces 
wider confidence intervals because it preserves the cross-correlation of fund returns. We 
then show that the average UK equity mutual fund manager is unable to deliver 
outperformance net of fees under either bootstrap. Gross of fees, 95% of fund managers on 
the basis of the first bootstrap and all fund managers on the basis of the second bootstrap 
fail to outperform the luck distribution of gross returns.  
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I.   Introduction 
Evidence collected over an extended period on the performance of (open-ended) mutual 
funds in the US (Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Wermers, Barras and Scaillet (2010)) and 
unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs)1 in the UK (Blake and 
Timmermann (1998), Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999)) has found that on average a 
fund manager cannot outperform the market benchmark and that any outperformance is 
more likely to be due to luck rather than skill. 
More recently, Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006, hereafter 
KTWW) reported that the time series returns of individual mutual funds typically exhibit 
non-normal distributions.2 They argued that this finding has important implications for the 
luck versus skill debate and that there was a need to re-examine the statistical significance 
of mutual fund manager performance using bootstrap techniques. They applied a bootstrap 
methodology (Efron and Tibshirani (1993), Politis and Romano (1994)) that creates a 
sample of monthly pseudo excess returns by randomly re-sampling residuals from a factor 
benchmark model and imposing a null of zero abnormal performance. Following the 
                                                          
1 These are, respectively, the UK and EU terms for open-ended mutual funds. There are 
differences, however, the principal one being that unit trusts have dual pricing (a bid and an 
offer price), while OEICs have single pricing. 
2 KTWW (p. 2559) put this down to the possibilities that (1) the residuals of fund returns 
are not drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, (2) correlations in these residuals 
are non-zero, (3) funds have different risk levels, and (4) parameter estimation error results 
in the standard critical values of the normal distribution being inappropriate in the cross 
section. 
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bootstrap exercise, KTWW determine how many funds from a large group one would 
expect to observe having large alphas by luck and how many are actually observed. Using 
data on 1,788 US mutual funds over the period January 1975–December 2002, they show 
that, by luck alone, 9 funds would be expect to achieve an annual alpha of 10% over a five-
year period. In fact, 29 funds achieve this hurdle: “this is sufficient, statistically, to provide 
overwhelming evidence that some fund managers have superior talent in picking stocks. 
Overall, our results provide compelling evidence that, net of all expenses and costs (except 
load charges and taxes), the superior alphas of star mutual fund managers survive and are 
not an artifact of luck” (p. 2553). 
Applying the same bootstrap method to 935 UK equity unit trusts and OEICs 
between April 1975–December 2002, Cuthbertson, Nitzche and O’Sullivan (2008) find 
similar evidence of significant stock picking ability amongst a small number of top-
performing fund managers. Blake, Rossi, Timmermann, Tonks and Wermers (2013) show 
that fund manager performance improves if the degree of decentralization – in the form of 
increasing specialization – is increased. 
However, these results have been challenged by Fama and French (2010, hereafter 
FF) who suggest an alternative bootstrap method which preserves any contemporaneously 
correlated movements in the volatilities of the explanatory factors in the benchmark model 
and the residuals. They calculate the Jensen alpha for each fund, and then compute pseudo 
returns by deducting the Jensen alpha from the actual returns to obtain benchmark-adjusted 
(zero-alpha) returns, thereby maintaining the cross-sectional relationship between the 
factor and residual volatilities (i.e., between the explained and unexplained components of 
returns). Their sample consists of 5,238 US mutual funds over the period January 1984–
 5 
September 2006, and following their bootstrap calculations, they conclude that there is 
little evidence of mutual fund manager skills.  
There are three differences between the KTWW and FF studies. First, while both 
studies use data for US domestic equity mutual funds, KTWW use data from 1975-2002, 
whereas the dataset in FF covers the more recent 1984-2006 period. Second, the studies 
use different fund inclusion criteria: KTWW restrict their sample to funds that have a 
minimum of 60 monthly observations, whereas FF restrict theirs to funds that have a 
minimum of 8 monthly observations Third and most important, with respect to the 
bootstrap method used, for each bootstrap simulation, the former simulate fund returns and 
factor returns independently of each other, whereas the latter simulate these returns jointly.  
It is important therefore to identify whether the different results from the two 
studies are due to the different time period analyzed, different inclusion criteria or the 
different bootstrap methods used. We will use a dataset of UK domestic equity mutual 
funds returns from January 1998–September 2008 to assess the performance of mutual 
fund managers. We will also compare the two different bootstrap methods using the same 
sample of funds over the same time period and with the same fund inclusion criterion.  
It is well known that the Jensen alpha measure of performance is biased in the 
presence of fund manager market timing skills (Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Merton and 
Henriksson (1981)). Grinblatt and Titman (1994) have suggested a total performance 
measure which is the sum of the Jensen alpha and market timing coefficients in an extended 
factor benchmark model. Allowing for market timing exacerbates the non-normality of 
standard significance tests and an additional contribution of this paper is to assess the 
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significance of the total performance measure in the KTWW and FF bootstrapped 
distributions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the approach to 
measuring mutual fund performance and shows how this approach has recently been 
augmented through the use of bootstraps. Section III discusses the dataset we will be using. 
The results are presented in Section IV, and Section V provides a summary of additional 
robustness checks, while Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Measuring Mutual Fund Performance  
A. Measuring Performance Using Factor Benchmark Models  
Building on Jensen’s original approach, we use a four-factor benchmark model to assess 
the performance or excess return over the riskless rate (
it tR rf ) of the manager of mutual 
fund i obtained in period t (out of a total of T possible periods): 
(1)   SMB HML  + MOMit t i i mt t i t i t i t itR rf R rf             
where the four common factors are the excess return on the market index ( )mt tR rf , the 
returns on a size factor,SMBt , and a book-to-market factor, HMLt  (Fama-French (1993)), 
and the return on a momentum factor, MOMt  (Carhart (1997)). The genuine skill of the 
fund manager, controlling for these common risk factors, is measured by alpha (αi) which 
is also known as the selectivity skill.3  
                                                          
3 Ferson and Schadt (1996) suggest a conditional version of this four-factor benchmark 
model that controls for time-varying factor loadings. However, Kosowski et al. (2006) 
report that the results from estimating the conditional and unconditional models are very 
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 Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance (i.e., no selectivity skill), 
the expected value of ˆi  should be equal to zero. For each fund, we could test the 
significance of each ˆi  as a measure of that fund’s abnormal performance relative to its 
standard error. We might also test the significance of the average value of the alpha across 
the N funds in the sample (Malkiel (1995)). Alternatively, we could follow Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) (and also Fama and French (2010), Table II) and regress an equal-
weighted (or a value-weighted) portfolio p of the excess returns ( )pt tR rf on the N funds 
on the four factors in equation (1) and test the significance of the estimated ˆ
p  in this 
regression.  
 The original Jensen approach made no allowance for the market timing abilities of 
fund managers when fund managers take an aggressive position in a bull market (by 
holding high-beta stocks) and a defensive position in a bear market (by holding low beta 
stocks). Treynor and Mazuy (1966) tested for market timing by adding a quadratic term in 
the market excess return in the benchmark model to capture the “curvature” in the fund 
manager’s performance as the market rises and falls. To test jointly for selectivity and 
market timing skills, we estimate a five-factor benchmark model: 
(2)      
2
 SMB HML  + MOMit t i i mt t i t i t i t i mt t itR rf R rf R rf                
                                                          
similar, and in the remainder of this paper we follow them and only consider the 
unconditional version of equation (1). 
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Market timing ability is measured by the sign and significance of ˆ
i . To capture both 
selectivity and timing skills simultaneously, we use the Treynor-Mazuy total performance 
measure (TMi) averaged over T periods: 
(3)   TMi i i mVar R rf     
This was derived in Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and its significance can be assessed using 
a t-statistic based on its standard error.4  
 
B. Assessing Performance Using Bootstrap Methods  
On account of non-normalities in returns, bootstrap methods need to be applied to both of 
the factor benchmark models (1) and (2) to assess performance. To apply the KTWW 
bootstrap in equation (1), we first obtain OLS-estimated alphas, factor loadings and 
residuals using a time series of monthly excess returns for fund i in equation (1). We then 
construct a sample of pseudo excess returns by randomly re-sampling residuals with 
replacement from 0 1ˆ{ , ,. . ., }it i it T T  , while preserving the historical ordering of the 
common risk factors, and impose the null of zero abnormal performance ( 0i  ): 
(4)  ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )  SMB HML  + MOMb bit t i mt t i t i t i t itR rf R rf           
where b is the bth bootstrap and ˆb
it  is a drawing from 0 1ˆ{ , ,. . ., }it i it T T  . By construction, 
this pseudo excess return series has zero alpha. For bootstrap b = 1, we regress the pseudo 
excess returns on the factors: 
(5)  ( ) SMB HML  + MOMbit t i i mt t i t i t i t itR rf R rf             
                                                          
4 Defined in Grinblatt and Titman (1994, Appendix B, p. 441). 
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and save the estimated alpha. We repeat for each fund, i = 1,…, N, to arrive at the first draw 
from the cross-section of bootstrapped alphas { , 1,..., ; 1}bi i N b    and the corresponding 
t-statistics { ( ), 1,..., ; 1}bit i N b   . We then repeat for all bootstrap iterations b = 1,…, 
10,000. It is important to reiterate that the common risk factors are not re-sampled in the 
KTWW bootstrap: their historical ordering is not varied across simulation runs. It is only 
the residuals that are re-ordered with this bootstrap.  
We now have the cross-sectional distribution of alphas from all the bootstrap 
simulations { , 1,. . . , ; 1,...,10,000}bi i N b    that result from the sampling variation under 
the null that the true alpha is zero. The bootstrapped alphas can be ranked from smallest to 
largest to produce the “luck” (i.e., pure chance or zero-skill) cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the alphas. We have a similar cross-sectional distribution of 
bootstrapped t-statistics { ( ), 1,. . . , ; 1,...,10,000}bit i N b    which can be compared with 
the distribution of actual ˆ{ ( ), 1,. . . , }it i N   values once both sets of t-statistics have been 
re-ordered from smallest to largest. We follow KTWW who prefer to work with the t-
statistics rather than the alphas, since the use of the t-statistic “controls for differences in 
risk-taking across funds” (p. 2555).5  
FF employ an alternative bootstrap method. They calculate alpha for each fund 
using the time series regression (1) as in KTWW. But FF do not re-sample the residuals of 
each individual fund as in KTWW, rather they re-sample with replacement over the full 
                                                          
5 KTWW (p. 2559) note that the t-statistic also provides a correction for spurious outliers 
by dividing the estimated alpha by a high estimated standard error when the fund has a 
short life or undertakes risky strategies.  
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cross section of returns, thereby producing a common time ordering across all funds in each 
bootstrap. The historical ordering of the common risk factors is therefore not preserved in 
this bootstrap. In our study, we re-sample from all 129 monthly observations in the dataset 
and we impose the null hypothesis as in FF by subtracting the estimate of alpha from each 
re-sampled month’s returns.6 For each fund and each bootstrap, we regress the pseudo 
excess returns on the factors: 
(6)    ˆ( )  SMB HML  + MOM
b
it t i i i mt t i t i t i t itR rf R rf                 
and save the estimated bootstrapped alphas { , 1,. . . , ; 1,...,10,000}bi i N b    and t- 
statistics { ( ), 1,. . . , ; 1,...,10,000}bit i N b   . We then rank the alphas and t-statistics 
from lowest to highest to form the FF “luck” distribution under the null hypothesis.   
                                                          
6 To illustrate, for bootstrap b = 1, suppose that the first time-series drawing is month 37t 
, then the first set of pseudo returns incorporating zero abnormal performance for this 
bootstrap is found by deducting i  from ,37 37( )iR rf  for every fund i that is in the sample for 
month 37.t   Suppose that the second time-series drawing is month 92t  , then the second 
set of pseudo returns is found by deducting i  from ,92 92( )iR rf  for every fund i that is in 
the sample for month 92t  . After T drawings, the first bootstrap is completed.  This 
contrasts with the KTWW bootstrap in which for b = 1, the first drawing for fund 1 might 
be that for month 37t   (assuming it is in the sample for this month), while the first 
drawing for fund 2 might be for month 92t   (assuming it is in the sample for this month), 
etc. 
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The most important difference between the two methods is that, within each 
bootstrap run, the FF bootstrap takes into account the cross-sectional distribution of the 
residuals, conditional on the realization of the systematic risk factors, while the KTWW 
bootstrap uses the unconditional distribution of the residuals and assumes both that there is 
independence between the residuals across different funds and that the influence of the 
common risk factors is fixed at their historical realisations.7 
There is one other potentially important difference between the two bootstrap 
methods as implemented in the two studies. KTWW include funds in their analysis with 
more than 60 monthly observations in the dataset, whereas the fund inclusion criterion with 
FF is 8 months. The different inclusion criteria involve a trade-off between the low 
estimation precision that is associated with estimating a model with a small number of 
degrees of freedom and the potential look ahead bias associated with estimating a model 
that requires funds to be in the data for some time. Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and Musto 
(2002) discuss sample biases in mutual fund performance evaluation and distinguish 
between “survivorship biases” (evaluation only on the selected sample of funds that are in 
existence at the end of the time period) and “look ahead biases” (evaluation of funds by 
only considering funds which survive for a minimum length of time).  Survivor bias is 
regarded as a property of the data set, whereas look-ahead bias results from any test 
methodology imposing a minimal survival period. In order to assess the sensitivity of these 
sample selection criteria on the look ahead bias, we will construct separate sub-samples 
                                                          
7 FF argue that the KTWW bootstrap’s “failure to account for the joint distribution of joint 
returns, and of fund and explanatory returns, biases the inferences of KTWW towards 
positive performance” (p. 1940). 
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based on including funds with at least 8, 15, 20, 40 and 60 monthly observations.  As the 
minimum number of monthly observations increases, the number of funds included in the 
sub-sample decreases.  
FF report that the distribution of actual ˆ( )it  values is to the left of that of the “luck” 
distribution of the bootstrapped ( )bit  values, particularly for funds with negative alphas, 
but also for most funds with positive alphas. FF conclude that there is little evidence of 
mutual fund manager skills. This contrasts with KTWW who conclude that there are a 
small number of genuinely skilled “star” fund managers.    
FF point out a common problem with both methods. By randomly sampling across 
individual fund residuals in the KTWW method and across individual time periods in the 
FF method, any effects of auto-correlation in returns is lost. KTWW (p. 2582) performed 
a sensitivity analysis of this issue by re-sampling in time series blocks up to 10 months in 
length. They found that the results changed very little.  
 
III. Data  
The data used in this study combines information from data providers Lipper, Morningstar 
and Defaqto and consists of the monthly returns on a full sample of 561 UK domestic 
equity (open-ended) mutual funds (unit trusts and OIECS) over the period January 1998–
September 2008, a total of 129 months. The dataset also includes information on annual 
management fees, fund size, fund family and relevant Investment Management Association 
(IMA) sectors.8 We include in our sample the primary sector classes for UK domestic 
                                                          
8 In 2014, the IMA changed its name to the Investment Association. 
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equity funds with the IMA definitions: UK All Companies, UK Equity Growth, UK Equity 
Income, UK Equity & Growth, and UK Smaller Companies. The sample is free from 
survivor bias (Elton et al. (1996), Carpenter and Lynch (1999)) and includes funds that 
both were created during the sample period and exited due to liquidation or merger. In 
order to assess the degree of look ahead bias in the alternative bootstrap methodologies, we 
construct five sub-samples of the data by imposing the restriction that funds in the sample 
must have at least 8, 15, 20, 40 and 60 consecutive monthly returns. These criteria result in 
sub-samples of 552, 535, 516, 454, and 384 funds, respectively. We will perform our 
bootstrap analysis on each of these five sub-samples separately. 
“Gross” returns are calculated from bid-to-bid prices and include reinvested 
dividends. These are reported net of on-going operating and trading costs, but before the 
fund management fee has been deducted. As reported in KhoranaServaes and Tufano 
(2009) operating costs include administration, record-keeping, research, custody, 
accounting, auditing, valuation, legal costs, regulatory costs, distribution, marketing and 
advertising. Trading costs include commissions, spreads and taxes. We also compute “net” 
returns for each fund by deducting the monthly equivalent of the annual fund management 
fee. We have complete information on these fees for 451 funds. For each of the remaining 
funds, each month we subtract the median monthly fund management fee for the relevant 
sector class and size quintile from the fund’s gross monthly return. As in KTWW and FF, 
we exclude initial and exit fees from our definition of net returns.  
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the returns to and the size of the 
mutual funds in our dataset. We compare the distributional properties of the gross and net 
returns for two of the sub-samples based on the selection criterion of 8 and 60 consecutive 
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monthly observations. The average (equally weighted) monthly gross return across the 552 
funds with at least 8 consecutive monthly observations in the dataset is 0.45% (45 basis 
points), compared with an average monthly return over the same period of 0.36% for the 
FT-All Share Index.9 The overall monthly standard deviation of these returns is 4.82%.  In 
the case of 384 mutual funds with a minimum of 60 consecutive observations, the gross 
mean return is marginally higher and the variance marginally lower. The mean monthly 
net return for the larger sub-sample of 552 funds is 0.35%, implying that the monthly fund 
management fee is 0.11%. The mean return is now very close to the mean return of 0.36% 
for the FT-All Share Index.  This provides initial confirmation that the average mutual fund 
manager cannot “beat the market” (i.e., cannot beat a buy-and-hold strategy invested in the 
market index), once all costs and fees have been taken into account.  
The table also shows that the within-fund standard deviation is much larger than 
the between-fund standard deviation, implying that fund returns tend to move together in 
any particular month, but are more volatile over time. Furthermore, the between-fund 
volatility in the case of a minimum sample size of 8 monthly observations is much higher 
than in the case where the minimum sample size is 60 monthly observations. This is 
because samples involving a minimum of 8 consecutive observations are more likely to be 
drawn from the tails of the distribution of returns than those involving a minimum of 60 
consecutive observations. Funds with only 8 observations in the data set are likely to have 
been closed down due to very poor performance.10   
                                                          
9 Note that the FT-All Share Index return is gross of any costs and fees. 
10 Evidence to support this conjecture is contained in Table 1. The 384 funds (with a 
minimum of 60 observations) have a mean gross monthly return of 0.0049, whereas the 
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The final column shows that the distribution of scheme size is skewed. While the 
median fund value for a sub-sample of 299 funds for which data on fund size are available 
in September 2008 is £63.3 million, the mean value is much larger at £234 million. It can 
also be seen that 10% of the funds have values above £503 million. 
 
IV. Results 
We now turn to assessing the performance of UK equity mutual funds over the period 1998-
2008. The results are divided into four sections. The first section looks at the performance 
of equal- and value-weighted portfolios of all 561 funds in the full sample against the four- 
and five-factor benchmark models over the whole sample period. The second section 
examines the properties of the moments of the actual, KTWW and FF CDFs for both the 
ˆ( )it   and (TM )it  performance measures. The third section compares the alpha 
performance of all the funds based on the actual t-statistics ˆ( )it   from the factor models 
with the simulated t-statistics ( )bit  generated by the bootstrap methods of KTWW and FF 
described above. We report the results for both gross and net returns, and for the different 
fund selection criteria. The fourth section conducts a total performance comparison based 
                                                          
552 funds (with a minimum of 8 observations) have a lower mean gross return of 0.0045. 
The latter group of funds have a higher standard deviation than the former and the 
quantiles of the CDF also show that these funds have much poorer returns throughout the 
distribution. These results are not affected by the censoring of the data at the beginning 
and end of the sample period. 
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on the actual and simulated t-statistics, (TM )it  and (TM )
b
it , for the two bootstraps, again 
using both gross and net returns.  
 
A. Performance Against Factor Benchmark Models 
Following Blake and Timmermann (1998), Table 2 reports the results from estimating the 
four- and five-factor models in equations (1) and (2) across all T = 129 time-series 
observations for the full sample of 561 funds, where the dependent variable is, first, the 
excess return on an equal-weighted portfolio p of all funds in existence at time t, and, 
second, the excess return on a value-weighted portfolio p of all funds in existence at time 
t, using starting market values as weights.11 For each portfolio, the first two columns report 
the loadings on each of the factors when the dependent variable is based on gross returns, 
while the second two columns report the corresponding results using net returns. The 
loadings on the market portfolio and on the SMBt factor are positive and significant, while 
the loadings are negative but insignificant on the HMLt  
factor. The factor loadings are 
positive but insignificant on the MOMt factor.
12  
                                                          
11 We use the monthly FTSE All-Share Index as the market benchmark for all UK equities. 
We take the excess return of this index over the UK Treasury bill rate. SMBt, HMLt, and 
MOMt are UK versions of the other factor benchmarks as defined in Gregory, Tharyan 
and Huang (2013). 
12 Note that the estimated factor loadings for the models where the dependent variable is based 
on gross returns are very similar to those in the corresponding models where the dependent 
variable is based on net returns. This is because the fund management fee is fairly constant 
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The alphas based on gross returns differ from the corresponding alphas based on 
net returns by the average level of fund management fees. However, the most important 
point is that the alpha (
p ) is not significant in the four-factor model and the total 
performance measure (  TMp p p mVar R rf    ) is not significant in the five-factor 
model. In the latter case, while 
p  can be significant – as in the case of the equal-weighted 
portfolio using gross returns at the 10% level – this is more than compensated for by the 
significantly negative loading on  
2
mt tR rf . This holds whether the portfolio is equal-
weighted or value-weighted,13 or whether we use gross returns or net returns.  A 
particularly interesting finding in Table 2 is that the estimate for 
p  in the four-factor 
model is very similar in size to the estimate of TM
p
in the corresponding five-factor model, 
even though both estimates are not statistically significant.14 Again this is true whether we 
compare on the basis of gross or net returns, or an equal- or value-weighted portfolio. This 
                                                          
over time. While this will lead to different estimates of the intercept (
p ) in a regression 
equation, it will not lead to significant changes in the estimates of the slope coefficients. 
13 The lower values of 
p and  TM p  in the value-weighted regressions compared with the 
corresponding equal-weighted regressions indicates diseconomies-of-scale in fund 
management performance.  
14 Grinblatt and Titman (1994, p. 438) report the same result in their dataset and argue that 
“the measures are similar because very few funds successfully time the market. In fact, the 
measures are significantly different for those funds that appear to have successfully timed 
the market”. 
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can only happen, of course, if the estimate of 
p in the five-factor model
 is lower than the 
estimate of 
p in the corresponding four-factor model by an amount approximately equal 
to the size of  p mVar R rf  .   
The implication of these results is that the average equity mutual fund manager in 
the UK is unskilled in the sense of being unable to deliver outperformance (i.e., unable to 
add value from the two key active strategies of stock selection and market timing), once 
allowance is made for fund manager fees and for a set of common risk factors that are 
known to influence returns, thereby reinforcing our findings from our examination of raw 
returns in Table 1. But what about the performance of the best and worst fund managers? 
To assess their performance, we turn to the bootstrap analysis.  
 
B. Moments of Actual, KTWW and FF Cumulative Distribution Functions 
We estimate the four- and five-factor benchmark models (1) and (2) across a range of sub-
samples (N = 552, 535, 516, 454, and 384) of mutual funds corresponding to the sample 
selection criteria of 8, 15, 20, 40 and 60 consecutive monthly time series observations 
between 1998 and 2008.  For each sub-sample, we then have a cross section of t-statistics 
on alpha which can be ranked from lowest to highest to form a CDF of the 
ˆ{ ( ), 1,. . . ., }it i N  statistics for the actual fund alphas. We also generate 10,000 KTWW 
and FF bootstrap simulations for each fund as described in Section 2 above. For each 
bootstrap, this will generate a cross section of t-statistics on alpha and TM, assuming no 
abnormal performance. For the five sub-samples there will be 5.52 million, 5.35 million, 
5.16 million, 4.54 million and 3.84 million respective t-statistics that can also be ranked 
from lowest to highest to create a CDF of bootstrapped “luck” 
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{ ( ), 1,. . . , ; 1,...,10,000}bit i N b    statistics for each bootstrap. In Figures 1 and 2, we plot 
these CDFs of the t-statistics on alpha for each percentile point of the distribution for the 
sub-samples constructed from the 552 funds with a minimum of 8 observations. The solid 
line in the centre of Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows the actual distribution of  ˆ( )t  estimated 
for gross and net returns, respectively, using the four-factor model. The heavy dashed and 
dotted lines in these figures show the CDFs for the average ˆ( )t  values across the 10,000 
simulations for the KTWW and FF bootstraps, respectively.  
The moments of the actual t(α) and t(TM) distributions, together with key 
percentiles of the corresponding KTWW and FF bootstrap distributions, are shown in Table 
3 for two sub-samples: funds with a minimum of 8 and 60 monthly observations, generating 
sample sizes of 552 and 384 funds, respectively. The factor models generate similar 
distributions for both gross and net t(α) and t(TM), with standard deviations in the range 
1.5-1.7, modest positive skewness in the range 0.5, and kurtosis in the range 8-9.  The 
KTWW bootstrap also generates similar distributions for both t(α) and t(TM). The 
distributions have (approximately) unit variance. They are also fairly symmetric and have 
a modest degree of excess kurtosis compared with the normal distribution. By contrast, the 
FF bootstrap distribution has a larger variance and much fatter tails (especially in the case 
of t(TM), where the left-skew is also more prominent).  It also has a high level of kurtosis 
in the sub-sample formed from a minimum of 8 consecutive monthly observations, 
implying that the sample selection criteria that gives the largest number of funds included 
in the analysis induces fat tails in the FF bootstrap simulations. Again, the most likely 
explanation is very poor performance prior to closure.    
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Table 3 also reports for each distribution the p-value from applying a Jarque-Bera 
test against the null hypothesis of normality. For the “actual” distribution, the hypothesis 
of normality was rejected in 4 out of 8 cases at the 5% significance level and in 6 out of 8 
cases at 10%.  In addition, this same test also clearly rejects normality of both the 
KTWW and FF average  ˆ( )t   distributions, which means that we cannot simply use the 
5% and 95% confidence intervals from the entire KTWW and FF distributions to detect 
significant under- or out-performance. Instead, the accumulated statistical evidence 
suggests that we need to apply the 5% - 95% confidence intervals of the KTWW and FF 
distributions at each percentile point of the actual CDF to determine abnormal 
performance.  
 
C. Alpha Performance Using KTWW and FF Bootstraps 
For each sub-sample, we compare the averaged values at selected percentiles of the CDF 
of the t-statistics on the actual alphas ( ˆ( )t  ) with the distribution of the t-statistics derived 
from the KTWW and FF bootstrap simulations ( ( )bt  ) in the same percentile ranges. We 
report the results of the analysis first using gross and then net returns. 
 
C.i.  Alpha Performance: Gross Returns 
Panel A of Table 4 reports key percentiles of the CDF of the ˆ( )t  statistics of the cross-
section of funds in the sub-sample of 552 funds formed from a minimum of 8 observations 
for gross returns using the distribution of ranked t-statistics for all such funds. Figure 1 
shows the same results graphically. It can be seen that the left tail of the CDF of the actual 
t-statistics lies to the left of that of both bootstraps. For example, in the 1st percentile range, 
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the actual t-statistic of the worst performing one percent of funds is -2.9043, while the 
KTWW and FF t-statistics for the same point on the distribution are -2.4516 and -2.449, 
respectively. This suggests that those funds in the bottom one percent of the distribution 
are there as a result of poor skill rather than bad luck. This holds for most of the distribution 
of returns. Only for percentiles of the CDF above about 70% is it the case that the actual t-
statistics begin to exceed those from either simulation method. For example, at the 95th 
percentile, the actual t-statistic is 2.2522, while the corresponding KTWW and FF t-
statistics are 1.683 and 1.6158. This means that those funds above the 70th percentile 
outperform their luck distribution, providing evidence of skill in terms of gross returns.  
We can also assess the significance of the actual t-values at each percentile point of 
its distribution. For every percentile point of the chance distribution generated by each of 
the two bootstrap methods, we calculate the 5% - 95% confidence intervals (CIs). This 
allows us to test whether the actual ˆ( )t  lies within the CI of each chance distribution. If 
the actual ˆ( )t  lies to the right (left) of the CI at a given percentile point, this provides 
robust evidence of managerial out (under)-performance at that percentile point. The 
confidence intervals at each percentile point are reported in Table 4 in brackets below the 
mean values of the KTWW and FF bootstrap values. It can be seen that the actual ˆ( )t   at 
the 1st percentile point of -2.9043 lies within the CI of both the KTWW (-3.0689, -1.8342) 
and FF (-3.4300, -1.4680) chance distributions, and therefore we cannot reject the null of 
no underperformance for the worst performing one percent of funds. However, at the other 
end of the distribution, the actual ˆ( )t  value at the 99th percentile of 3.0773 lies to the right 
of the KTWW CI (1.7724, 3.0630), but within the FF CI (1.4288, 3.3645). The implication 
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is that the top 1% of funds significantly outperform the KTWW chance distribution, but 
not the FF chance distribution.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, the 5% - 95% CI at each percentile point is much 
wider for the FF bootstraps than the KTWW bootstraps. Further, the range of the 5% - 95% 
CIs is relatively constant over the entire distribution of the FF bootstraps. In contrast, the 
5% - 95% CIs for the KTWW bootstraps are narrower over the entire distribution and they 
narrow considerably around the median (which is the point of zero abnormal performance 
under the null). The wider CIs for the FF bootstrap is a consequence of using the same time 
series observations for all funds to “capture the cross-correlation of fund returns and its 
effects on the distribution of t(α) estimates” (FF, p. 1925), while the narrower CIs for the 
KTWW bootstrap is due to “pooling over time”.15 Within each KTWW bootstrap, some 
funds’ excess returns for a given time period (under the null of no abnormal performance 
and conditional on the realisation of the common risk factors) will be drawn from a period 
in the data sample when there was a bull market, while other funds’ excess returns will be 
drawn from a period when there was a bear market.  This will result in a narrowing of the 
distribution of abnormal returns when averaged across a large number of bootstraps. The 
CIs for the KTWW bootstrap widen slightly in the tails of the distribution, since in this 
region, the bootstrap will pick up more extreme outliers and hence the pooling effect is 
reduced. By contrast, within every FF bootstrap, all funds’ excess returns for a given time 
period (under the null of no abnormal performance) will be drawn from the same randomly 
selected historical period which could be either a bull market or a bear market. With the 
                                                          
15 Fitzenberger and Kurtz (2003, p. 357). 
 23 
FF bootstrap, there is no pooling over time. This results in a wider distribution of abnormal 
returns under the FF methodology when averaged across the same number of bootstraps, 
compared with the KTWW methodology.16 
 We also investigate the effect of the sample selection criteria on the detection of 
significant abnormal performance. In Table 5 Panel A, we report the actual and 
bootstrapped ˆ( )t   statistics of the cross-section of funds in the sub-sample formed from a 
minimum of 60 observations for gross returns.  The effect of increasing the minimum 
number of observations for inclusion in the sub-sample is to shift the actual ˆ( )t  CDF to 
the right compared with Table 4. For example, at the 50th percentile point, the actual t-
statistic is 0.0071 compared with -0.0587 in Table 4. This shift to the right in the ˆ( )t 
distribution is consistent with a positive look-ahead bias in the gross returns in the more 
restrictive sample of 384 funds with at least 60 consecutive observations.17 The effect of 
the look-ahead bias on the distribution of the KTWW and FF bootstraps is also apparent: 
for both bootstraps, the range of the 5% - 95% CIs widens. For example, at the 10th 
percentile, the KTWW range widens slightly from 0.631 to 0.677, but the FF range widens 
noticeably more from 1.714 to 2.029. In both cases, the widening of the CIs is explained 
by having a smaller number of funds in this bootstrap compared with the one in Table 5 
                                                          
16 Note KTWW (p. 2583) also consider a “block bootstrap” that samples across funds during 
the same time period to preserve any cross-sectional correlation in the residuals. 
17 This implies that tests requiring a minimum of 8 observations are more stringent than 
those requiring a minimum of 60 observations. 
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Panel A (i.e., 384 against 552), reducing the precision of our estimates of the parameters 
of the underlying distribution. 
 
C.ii. Alpha Performance: Net Returns 
Assessing alpha performance using net returns rather than gross returns raises the 
performance hurdle, since we are now assessing whether fund managers are able to add 
value for their investors after covering their operating and trading costs and their own fee. 
Subtracting fees from gross returns to derive net returns will reduce the values of both the 
actual alphas and their t-statistics. Figure 2 shows the consequences of this graphically: the 
CDF of the actual t-statistics of the alphas shifts significantly to the left.18 This is confirmed 
by Panel B of Table 4, in the case where the selection criterion requires a minimum of 8 
monthly observations. For example, at the 5th percentile, the actual t-statistic is -2.6194, 
down from -2.0434 in Panel A. By contrast, there is little or no change in either the KTWW 
t-statistic at -1.7043 (unchanged) or the FF t-statistic at -1.6172 (up from -1.6336). Figure 
                                                          
18 The CDFs for the averaged values of both the KTWW and FF bootstrap simulations do not 
move significantly at all when there is a switch from gross to net returns. In the case of the 
KTWW bootstrap, this can be seen if we set 0i   in (5) for both gross and net returns, since 
no other variable on the right-hand side of  (5)  changes when we make an allowance for fund 
manager fees. In the case of the FF bootstrap, the influence of fees is broadly cancelled out in 
the dependent variable ˆ( )
b
it t iR rf     in (6), since itR will be lower by the i
th manager’s fee 
and ˆ
i will be lower by the average fee across the sample which will be of similar size. Figures 
1 and 2 show the same result graphically.  
 25 
2 and Panel B of Table 4 clearly show that, once fund manager fees are taken into account, 
the actual ˆ( )t   either lies to the left of the CIs of the two chance bootstrap distributions or 
within the CIs themselves, but never to the right, implying that at no fund in our sample 
generated significant outperformance.  
 Turning to the effect of the sample selection criteria, Panel B of Table 5, where the 
selection criterion requires a minimum of 60 monthly observations, shows that the 
distribution of the actual t-statistics on net returns is not greatly affected by the increase 
from 8 to 60 observations, in contrast to the results for gross returns, with slight movements 
to the right or left at different points along the distribution. With respect to the distributions 
of the two bootstraps, as with the gross returns, the range of both 5% - 95% CIs widen, 
slightly for KTWW and more so for the FF bootstrap. For example, at the 10th percentile 
point, the range of the KTWW bootstrap widens from 0.639 to 0.670, and the range of the 
FF bootstrap widens from 1.696 to 2.032. 
 
D. TM Performance Using KTWW and FF Bootstraps 
We now repeat the analysis of the previous sub-section, but use the five-factor benchmark 
model in (2) and focus on the TM total performance measure instead of alpha. Using the 
case of the sub-sample constructed on the basis of a minimum of 8 consecutive monthly 
observations, we report the results of the analysis first using gross and then net returns.19 
 
                                                          
19 In the case of the FF bootstrap, the dependent variable in (6) becomes  
 
2
ˆ ˆ( )
b
it t i i mt tR rf R rf      
. 
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D.i. TM Performance: Gross Returns  
Panel A of Table 6 looks at TM performance based on gross returns. A comparison of the 
Act column in this table with that in Panel A in Table 4 shows some similarity in the values 
of the t-statistics for the TM and alpha gross return performance measures at the same 
percentiles.20 Both tables demonstrate that it is only for percentiles of the CDF above about 
70% that it is the case that the actual t-statistics exceed those from either simulation 
method. For example, at the 95th percentile point, the actual t-statistic is 2.3152 (compared 
with 2.2522 when the performance measure is alpha), while the KTWW average t-statistic 
is 1.6794 (compared with 1.6830) and the FF average t-statistic is 1.6212 (compared with 
1.6158). Above the 95th percentile, the actual t-statistic significantly outperforms the 
KTWW chance distribution,21 but not the FF chance distribution. The regression analysis 
in section 4.1 produced a similar finding. We therefore have the same interpretation of this 
finding, namely that only a minority of funds are able to generate returns from stock 
selection and market timing that are more than sufficient to cover their operating and 
trading costs, let alone the fund manager fee. 
 
D.ii. TM Performance: Net Returns  
Panel B of Table 6 examines TM performance based on net returns. A comparison of the 
Act column in this table with that in Panel B of Table 4 shows the same pattern in the values 
of the TM and alpha net return performance measures that the previous sub-section found 
when looking at gross returns.  There is significant under-performance at the lower end of 
                                                          
20 For the same reason given by Grinblatt and Titman (1994, p. 438) in footnote 14 above. 
21 Except at the 99th percentile. 
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the distribution for both bootstraps, and funds never significantly outperform either 
bootstrap at the upper end of the distribution. This is shown in Figure 3. 
 
V. Robustness Tests 
An online Appendix provides a series of robustness tests of our findings. In particular, we 
report the results from varying the selection criterion from a minimum of 8 observations, 
through 15, 20, and 40 observations, to 60 observations. These differing sample selection 
criteria results in five sub-samples of funds with the size of the sub-samples ranging from 
552, 535, 516, 454, and 384 funds. The bootstrap distributions are generated for both 
definitions of returns (gross and net) and for the four factor and five factor models (t(α) 
and t(TM)).  
In general, we find that as we increase the minimum number of observations (and 
reduce the number of funds) for inclusion in the analysis, the actual distribution of gross 
returns shifts to the right slightly. This is consistent with look-ahead bias: funds with 
greater average gross abnormal performance stay longer in the data set (and vice versa). 
As we increase the required minimum number of observations (and reduce the number of 
funds) for inclusion in the analysis, both the FF and KTWW 5%-95% CIs widen, most 
particularly in the case of the FF bootstrap. The number of funds included in the analysis 
falls, reducing the precision of our estimates of the parameters of the underlying 
distribution and hence widening the CIs. 
Under the generation of the chance distribution using the KTWW methodology, we 
find evidence of abnormal performance for the top-performing funds in terms of gross 
returns for all selection criteria for both t(α)s and t(TM)s. In contrast, for the FF 
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methodology for gross returns, there are no instances, irrespective of either the selection 
criteria or the factor model employed, of rejection of the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance. Under both methodologies, when it comes to examining net returns, there is 
no evidence of (positive) abnormal performance using any assessment criterion. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we use a new dataset of UK equity 
mutual funds to assess both the Jensen-alpha and Treynor-Mazuy total performance (TM) 
measures of mutual fund manager skills using factor benchmark models. TM is superior to 
an assessment based on alpha alone, since it includes market timing skills as well as 
selectivity skills; most existing studies, including KTWW and FF, only examine 
selectivity. Second, we compare directly the KTWW and FF bootstrap methods for 
assessing mutual fund manager performance (both alpha and TM) using the same funds 
selected using the same inclusion criteria over the same sample period.22  We conduct the 
analysis for both gross and net (of fund manager fee) returns. On the basis of a dataset of 
equity mutual funds in the UK over the period 1998-2008, we draw the following 
conclusions.  
First, the average equity mutual fund manager in the UK is unable to deliver 
outperformance from either stock selection or market timing, once allowance is made for 
fund manager fees and for the set of common risk factors known to influence returns.  
                                                          
22 FF did not reproduce the KTWW bootstrap method on their dataset. They used their 
bootstrap method with the KTWW inclusion criterion and sample period to assess the KTWW 
method. 
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There is some evidence that, set against the KTWW criterion, the top performing fund 
managers do outperform in terms of gross returns. However, there is no evidence that any 
fund manager significantly outperforms in respect of either gross or net returns on the 
basis of the FF bootstrap.  The TM results yield similar conclusions and indicate that the 
vast majority of fund managers are very poor at market timing. There is some evidence 
that the top performing fund managers outperform in respect of gross returns when using 
the KTWW bootstrap. Any selectivity skills that fund managers might possess – and at 
best only a very small number of them do – are wiped out both by their attempts to time 
the market and by their fees.   
Our results suggest that the evaluation of fund manager performance depends 
crucially on the bootstrap methodology employed. In the case of gross returns, the KTWW 
bootstrap identifies a number of fund managers whose performance produces significant 
abnormal returns (as indicated by the alpha t-statistics) at certain percentiles. However, 
when the confidence intervals are calculated for the FF bootstrap at the same percentiles, 
there is no evidence of outperformance, as the CDF of the actual alpha t-statistics lies well 
within the FF confidence interval. For net returns, neither methodology produces any 
evidence of significant abnormal performance.  
The explanation for this difference in findings is that, within each bootstrap 
simulation, the KTWW bootstrap simulates fund returns and factor returns independently 
of each other which means that, for a given time period, some returns will be drawn for a 
period in the data sample when the market was bullish and some from a period when the 
market was bearish, whereas the latter simulates these returns jointly and hence draws all 
returns from the same historical time period. As a result, over a large number of simulation 
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trials, the KTWW bootstrap will be affected by “pooling over time” which leads to much 
narrower confidence intervals than the FF bootstrap. 
Taken together, the above results provide powerful evidence that the vast majority 
of fund managers in our dataset were not simply unlucky, they were genuinely unskilled. 
Although a small group of “star” fund managers appear to have sufficient skills to 
generate superior gross performance (in excess of operating and trading costs), they 
extract the whole of this superior performance for themselves via their fees, leaving 
nothing for investors. 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics on UK Equity Mutual Funds 1998-2008 
 
Table reports average monthly gross and net returns from February 1998 to September 2008 (129 months) for the case of 552 funds with a 
minimum of 8 consecutive observations and for the case of 384 funds with a minimum of 60 consecutive observations. It also reports the monthly 
total standard deviation for these cases as well as the between-fund and within-fund standard deviation. The former is the average over time of the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of fund returns, while the latter is the average across funds of the time-series standard deviation of returns. The 
table also reports key percentiles of the distribution of returns. Finally, it reports average monthly fund management fees over the same period, as 
well as the size of funds at the end of the sample period. 
 Gross 
returns 
(≥8 
months) 
Gross 
returns 
(≥60 
months) 
Net 
returns 
(≥8 
months) 
Net 
returns 
(≥60 
months) 
Fund 
management 
fee 
(≥8 months) 
Size at 30 Sep 
2008 
(≥8 months, 
£ millions) 
Mean 0.0045 0.0049 0.0033 0.0038 0.0011 234.64 
Std. dev. 0.0482 0.0478 0.0482 0.0478 0.0002 644.24 
Between-fund std. dev. 0.0081 0.0030 0.0082 0.0030 0.0002  
Within-fund std. dev. 0.0479 0.0477 0.0479 0.0477 0.0001  
10% -0.0587 -0.0580 -0.0598 -0.0592 0.0008 7.86 
25% -0.0186 -0.0183 -0.0198 -0.0194 0.0010 25.87 
50% 0.0128 0.0132 0.0117 0.0121 0.0012 63.30 
75% 0.0330 0.0333 0.0318 0.0322 0.0012 196.18 
90% 0.0525 0.0532 0.0514 0.0520 0.0012 503.77 
Obs. 48,030 42,255 48,030 42,255 48,030 299 
No. of funds 552 384 552 384 552 299 
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TABLE 2 Estimates of Factor Models for UK Equity Mutual Fund Portfolios 
 
Results in table are based on the four-factor model without market timing, equation (1) and the five-factor model with market timing, equation (2) 
based on data for 561 funds. The dependent variable, is either the excess return on an equal-weighted portfolio or on a value-weighted portfolio p 
of all funds in existence at time t. The dependent variable is measured both gross and net of fund management fees. The total performance measure 
(equation (3)) is also reported.  Relevant t-statistics estimated from White (1980)’s robust standard errors are reported in brackets underneath each 
parameter estimate: ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, and 5% levels. 
 
 Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
 Gross 
returns 
Gross returns  
with market 
timing 
Net returns Net returns  
with market 
timing 
Gross returns Gross returns  
with market 
timing 
Net returns Net returns  with 
market timing 
p  0.0002 0.0016* -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0003 
 (0.20) (1.71) (-1.27) (0.49) (-0.21) (1.414) (-1.62) (0.27) 
 mt tR rf  0.9490** 0.9167** 0.9485** 0.9168** 0.9380** 0.9037** 0.9379** 0.9038** 
 (41.53) (40.36) (41.46) (40.3) (41.39) (43.29) (41.39) (43.29) 
SMBt  0.2526** 0.2522** 0.2528** 0.2524** 0.1832** 0.1828** 0.1834** 0.1829** 
 (9.96) (10.88) (9.96) (10.88) (7.35) (8.33) (7.36) (8.34) 
HMLt  -0.0298 -0.0318 -0.0298 -0.0318 -0.0068 -0.0090 -0.0068 -0.0089 
 (-1.27) (-1.40) (-1.26) (-1.40) (-0.30) (-0.42) (-0.30) (-0.42)    
MOMt  0.0178 0.0136 0.0178 0.0135 0.0031 -0.0015 0.0031 -0.0015 
 (0.99) (0.78) (0.98) (0.78) (0.17) (-0.09) (0.17) (-0.09)    
 
2
mt tR rf   -0.8117*  -0.8102  -0.8725*  -0.8694   
  (-2.16)  (-2.16)  (-2.15)  (-2.15)    
TM
p
  0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0001  -0.0012 
  (0.24)  (1.28)  (-0.18)  (1.63) 
R2 0.964 0.966 0.964 0.966 0.958 0.961 0.958 0.961 
Obs. 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 
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TABLE 3 Moments of CDFs of t(α) and t(TM): Actual, KTWW and FF Bootstraps 
 
Table shows key moments of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for t(α) and t(TM) statistics from 4-factor and 5-factor models, and the 
KTWW and FF bootstraps for both gross and net excess returns. The table also reports, for each distribution, the p-value from applying a Jarque-
Bera (J-B) test against the null hypothesis of normality (a p-value below a specified significance level indicates rejection of normality at that 
significance level). 
 
Method Moments t(α) t(TM) 
Sub-sample  Gross 
returns 
min 8 obs 
Gross 
returns 
min 60 obs 
Net  
returns 
min 8 obs 
Net  
returns 
min 60 obs 
Gross 
returns 
min 8 obs 
Gross 
returns 
min 60 obs 
Net  
returns 
min 8 obs 
Net   
returns 
min 60 obs 
Actual No. obs. 552 384 552 384 552 384 552 384 
 Mean -0.039 0.033 -0.671 -0.702 -0.039 0.054 -0.680 -0.687 
 St. dev. 1.242 1.222 1.304 1.303 1.264 1.232 1.325 1.313 
 Skewness 0.524 0.569 0.500 0.533 0.439 0.587 0.426 0.554 
 Kurtosis 8.131 7.752 9.189 9.284 8.615 7.925 9.669 9.496 
 J-B test 
(p-value) 
0.004 0.007 0.055 0.103 0.023 0.009 0.172 0.100 
FF No. obs. 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 
 Mean -0.005 -0.001 0.012 0.003 -0.025 -0.021 -0.024 -0.025 
 St. dev. 1.102 1.064 1.102 1.069 1.184 1.075 1.192 1.073 
 Skewness -0.298 -0.041 0.725 -0.046 5.169 -0.093 23.657 -0.097 
 Kurtosis 18.130 4.345 140.882 4.419 1,679.743 4.619 12,309.389 4.591 
 J-B test 
(p-value) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
KTWW No. obs. 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 5.52m 3.84m 
 Mean -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 
 St. dev. 1.037 1.021 1.038 1.021 1.042 1.021 1.042 1.021 
 Skewness -0.024 -0.047 -0.024 -0.045 -0.096 -0.061 -0.106 -0.061 
 Kurtosis 4.215 3.495 4.222 3.493 9.569 3.504 7.737 3.531 
 J-B test 
(p-value) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 34 
TABLE 4 Percentiles of CDFs of t(α): Actual, KTWW and FF bootstraps 
(8 monthly observations selection criteria) 
 
Table shows percentiles of CDFs of t(α) estimated from four-factor model in equation (1) with  (i = 1, …, 552), where the 
dependent variable in these regressions is the excess gross return in Panel A and excess net return in Panel B. The 552 funds 
in this sample have at least 8 monthly observations of returns. Table shows the averaged values for selected percentiles (Pct) 
of the cumulative distribution function of the actual t(α) statistics for the estimated alphas (Act) in this regression. The table 
also shows for the same percentiles the averaged values of t(α) from 5.52 million simulations of the KTWW and FF bootstraps 
(Sim(KTWW) and Sim(FF)), together with the 5 and 95% confidence intervals. 
  
 Panel A: gross returns Panel B: net returns 
Pct Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
1 -2.9043 -2.4516 -2.4490 -3.5897 -2.4493 -2.4369 
  (-3.0689, -1.8342) (-3.4300, -1.4680)  (-3.0738, -1.8247) (-3.3976, -1.4762) 
5 -2.0434 -1.7043 -1.6336 -2.6194 -1.7043 -1.6172 
  (-2.0850, -1.3236) (-2.5118, -0.7553)  (-2.0892, -1.3195) (-2.4815, -0.7529) 
10 -1.5990 -1.3149 -1.2577 -2.3073 -1.3154 -1.2413 
  (-1.6302, -0.9997) (-2.1149, -0.4005)  (-1.6347, -0.9960) (-2.0892, -0.3934) 
20 -1.0258 -0.8604 -0.8172 -1.7972 -0.8603 -0.8013 
  (-1.1096, -0.6112) (-1.6571, 0.0227)  (-1.1120, -0.6085) (-1.6340, 0.0313) 
30 -0.7248 -0.5353 -0.5076 -1.3425 -0.5363 -0.4907 
  (-0.7277, -0.3429) (-1.3364, 0.3212)  (-0.7328, -0.3399) (-1.3144, 0.3331) 
40 -0.3404 -0.2589 -0.2446 -0.9795 -0.2596 -0.227 
  (-0.3781, -0.1398) (-1.0685, 0.5794)  (-0.3812, -0.1380) (-1.0453, 0.5905) 
50 -0.0587 0.0003 0.0003 -0.6939 0.0006 0.0178 
  (-0.1139, 0.1145) (-0.8210, 0.8215)  (-0.1143, 0.1155) (-0.7986, 0.8342) 
60 0.2022 0.2551 0.2440 -0.3818 0.2549 0.2611 
  (0.1358, 0.3743) (-0.5772, 1.0651)  (0.1351, 0.3746) (-0.5566, 1.0788) 
70 0.5485 0.5281 0.5053 -0.0599 0.5291 0.5221 
  (0.3854, 0.6708) (-0.3182, 1.3289)  (0.3844, 0.6737) (-0.3009, 1.3450) 
80 0.9258 0.8495 0.8139 0.3639 0.8497 0.8297 
  (0.6642, 1.0347) (-0.0149, 1.6427)  (0.6653, 1.0342) (-0.0006, 1.6599) 
90 1.4930 1.2982 1.2485 0.9103 1.2987 1.2633 
  (1.0486, 1.5479) (0.4064, 2.0905)  (1.0479, 1.5496) (0.4177, 2.1089) 
95 2.2522 1.6830 1.6158 1.6392 1.6837 1.6316 
  (1.3515, 2.0144) (0.7532, 2.4784)  (1.3479, 2.0196) (0.7659, 2.4974) 
99 3.0773 2.4177 2.3966 2.5013 2.4184 2.4147 
  (1.7724, 3.0630) (1.4288, 3.3645)  (1.7830, 3.0537) (1.4414, 3.3880) 
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TABLE 5 Percentiles of CDFs of t(α): Actual, KTWW and FF bootstraps 
(60 monthly observations selection criteria) 
 
Table shows percentiles of CDFs of t(α) estimated from four-factor model in equation (1) with  (i = 1, …, 384), where the 
dependent variable in these regressions is the excess gross return in Panel A and excess net return in Panel B. The 384 funds 
in this sample have at least 60 monthly observations of returns.able shows the averaged values for selected percentiles (Pct) 
of the cumulative distribution function of the actual t(α) statistics for the estimated alphas (Act) in this regression. The table 
also shows for the same percentiles the averaged values of t(α) from 3.84 million simulations of the KTWW and FF 
bootstraps (Sim(KTWW) and Sim(FF)), together with the 5 and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
  
 Panel A: gross returns Panel B: net returns 
Pct Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
 
Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
 
1 -2.7686 -2.4262 -2.2587 -3.5897 -2.4294 -2.2598 
  (-2.9963, -1.8560) (-3.3744, -1.1430)  (-3.0005, -1.8582) (-3.3830, -1.1366) 
5 -1.9076 -1.6735 -1.5292 -2.7294 -1.6742 -1.5295 
  (-2.0627, -1.2843) (-2.5601, -0.4983)  (-2.0596, -1.2888) (-2.5628, -0.4962) 
10 -1.4281 -1.3055 -1.1892 -2.3424 -1.3066 -1.1888 
  (-1.6442, -0.9669) (-2.2035, -0.1750)  (-1.6417, -0.9715) (-2.2045, -0.1730) 
20 -0.9844 -0.8607 -0.7820 -1.8070 -0.8614 -0.7795 
  (-1.1439, -0.5774) (-1.7800, 0.2161)  (-1.1376, -0.5851) (-1.7805, 0.2214) 
30 -0.6723 -0.5328 -0.4817 -1.4191 -0.5321 -0.4789 
  (-0.7645, -0.3011) (-1.4744, 0.5110)  (-0.7514, -0.3128) (-1.4740, 0.5161) 
40 -0.2997 -0.2584 -0.2323 -1.0309 -0.2591 -0.2290 
  (-0.4036, -0.1133) (-1.2212, 0.7565)  (-0.4002, -0.1179) (-1.2215, 0.7634) 
50 0.0071 0.0013 0.0065 -0.6945 0.0007 0.0104 
  (-0.1324, 0.1350) (-0.9814, 0.9944)  (-0.1313, 0.1327) (-0.9795, 1.0002) 
60 0.2737 0.2535 0.2386 -0.4239 0.2523 0.2423 
  (0.1164, 0.3907) (-0.7490, 1.2261)  (0.1168, 0.3878) (-0.7468, 1.2315) 
70 0.5920 0.5241 0.4869 -0.0432 0.5233 0.4909 
  (0.3579, 0.6903) (-0.5021, 1.4760)  (0.3590, 0.6876) (-0.4989, 1.4807) 
80 0.9790 0.8489 0.7835 0.3295 0.8483 0.7884 
  (0.6407, 1.0570) (-0.2118, 1.7789)  (0.6402, 1.0565) (-0.2045, 1.7814) 
90 1.5600 1.2876 1.1848 0.8548 1.2869 1.1906 
  (1.0283, 1.5469) (0.1792, 2.1905)  (1.0239, 1.5500) (0.1854, 2.1957) 
95 2.2804 1.6474 1.5144 1.6854 1.6470 1.5223 
  (1.3349, 1.9600) (0.4943, 2.5346)  (1.3319, 1.9622) (0.5020, 2.5425) 
99 2.9835 2.3783 2.2157 2.5013 2.3775 2.2251 
  (1.8809, 2.8757) (1.1201, 3.3113)  (1.8783, 2.8768) (1.1325, 3.3178) 
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TABLE 6 Percentiles of CDFs of t(TM): Actual, KTWW and FF bootstraps 
 
Table shows percentiles of CDFs of t(α) estimated from five-factor model in equation (2) with  (i = 1, …, 552), where the 
dependent variable in these regressions is the excess gross return in Panel A and excess net return in Panel B. The 552 funds 
in this sample have at least 8 monthly observations of returns. Table shows the averaged values for selected percentiles 
(Pct) of the cumulative distribution function of the actual t(TM) statistics for the estimated alphas (Act) in this regression. 
Table also shows for the same percentiles the averaged values of t(TM) from 5.52 million simulations of the KTWW and 
FF bootstraps (Sim(KTWW) and Sim(FF)), together with the 5 and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Panel A: gross returns Panel B: net returns 
Pct Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
Act Sim(KTWW) 
(5%, 95%) 
Sim(FF) 
(5%, 95%) 
1 -3.0142 -2.4717 -2.5900 -3.5963 -2.4756 -2.5874 
  (-3.1903, -1.7531) (-3.6829,-1.4971)  (-3.2328, -1.7184) (-3.6558, -1.5191) 
5 -2.0419 -1.7128 -1.6994 -2.7332 -1.7135 -1.6938 
  (-2.1084, -1.172) (-2.5981 , -0.8007)  (-2.1143, -1.3128) (-2.5786, -0.8091) 
10 -1.6153 -1.3205 -1.3064 -2.3454 -1.3198 -1.3023 
  (-1.6410, -1.0001) (-2.1778, -0.4351)  (-1.6393 , -1.0003) (-2.1614 , -0.4432) 
20 -1.0288 -0.8642 -0.8504 -1.7912 -0.8634 -0.8476 
  (-1.1168, -0.6117) (-1.6982, -0.0026)  (-1.1149, -0.6119) (-1.6858 , -0.0095) 
30 -0.7274 -0.5395 -0.5327 -1.3916 -0.5374 -0.5305 
  (-0.7386, -0.3403) (-1.3659 , 0.3004)  (-0.7336, -0.3413) (-1.3567, 0.2957) 
40 -0.3523 -0.2619 -0.2646 -0.9965 -0.2603 -0.2631 
  (-0.3885, -0.1353) (-1.0884 , 0.5593)  (-0.3830, -0.1376) (-1.0822 , 0.5560) 
50 -0.0477 -0.0016 -0.0153 -0.6899 -0.0006 -0.0142 
  (-0.1183, 0.1150) (-0.8345, 0.8040)  (-0.1167 , 0.1156) (-0.8297, 0.8013) 
60 0.2012 0.2529 0.2319 -0.3813 0.2538 0.2323 
  (0.1321, 0.3736) (-0.5855,1.0494)  (0.1328,  0.3747) (-0.5825 , 1.0470) 
70 0.5541 0.5268 0.4962 -0.0267 0.5272 0.4953 
  (0.3751,  0.6785) (-0.3212 , 1.3135)  (0.3791,  0.6753) (-0.3202 , 1.3107) 
80 0.9515 0.8481 0.8073 0.3761 0.8485 0.8063 
  (0.6553,  1.0408) (-0.0131, 1.6278)  (0.6576,  1.0394) (-0.0138, 1.6265) 
90 1.5173 1.2961 1.2463 0.9453 1.2958 1.2449 
  (1.0379,  1.5543) (0.4186,  2.0739)  (1.0408,  1.5508) (0.4151,  2.0746) 
95 2.3152 1.6794 1.6212 1.6624 1.6798 1.6196 
  (1.3309, 2.0278) (0.7755,  2.4668)  (1.3340,  2.0257) (0.7740,  2.4652) 
99 3.0057 2.4118 2.4541 2.4855 2.4135 2.4474 
  (1.7161,  3.1075) (1.4642,  3.4439)  (1.7151,  3.1119) (1.4628,  3.4321) 
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FIGURE 1 CDFs: Gross Returns t(α) 
 
Results based on four-factor model in equation (1),  (i = 1, . . . , 552), where the dependent variable is the 
excess gross return. The 552 funds in this sample have at least 8 monthly observations of returns. The figure 
shows the cumulative distribution function of the averaged values of the actual t(α) statistics for the estimated 
alphas in this regression. The figure also shows the cumulative distribution function of the averaged values of 
t(α) from 5.52 million simulations of the KTWW and FF bootstraps, together with the 5 and 95% confidence 
intervals. The dark grey shaded area denotes the 5%-95% confidence interval at each percentile point from the 
KTWW chance distribution. The light grey shaded area denotes the 5%-95% confidence interval at each 
percentile point from the FF chance distribution. The solid heavy line denotes the CDF of the 
actual/(estimated) t(α), the dashed and dotted line are the CDFs generated by the KTWW and FF chance 
distributions respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 38 
FIGURE 2 CDFs: Net Returns t(α) 
 
Results based on four-factor model in equation (1),  (i = 1, . . . , 552), where the dependent variable is the excess net 
return. The 552 funds in this sample have at least 8 monthly observations of returns. The figure shows the cumulative 
distribution function of the averaged values of the actual t(α) statistics for the estimated alphas in this regression. The 
figure also shows the cumulative distribution function of the averaged values of t(α) from 5.52 million simulations of the 
KTWW and FF bootstraps, together with the 5 and 95% confidence intervals. The dark grey shaded area denotes the 5%-
95% confidence interval at each percentile point from the KTWW chance distribution. The light grey shaded area denotes 
the 5%-95% confidence interval at each percentile point from the FF chance distribution. The solid heavy line denotes the 
CDF of the actual/(estimated) t(α), the dashed and dotted line are the CDFs generated by the KTWW and FF chance 
distributions, respectively. 
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FIGURE 3 CDFs: Net Returns t(TM) 
 
Results based on five-factor model in equation (2), (i = 1, . .  , 552), where the dependent variable is the excess net return. 
The 552 funds in this sample have at least 8 monthly observations of returns. The figure shows the cumulative distribution 
function of the averaged values of the actual t(TM) statistics for the estimated alphas in this regression. The figure also 
shows the cumulative distribution function of the averaged values of t(TM) from 5.52 million simulations of the KTWW 
and FF bootstraps, together with the 5 and 95% confidence intervals. The dark grey shaded area denotes the 5%-95% 
confidence interval at each percentile point from the KTWW chance distribution. The light grey shaded area denotes the 
5%-95% confidence interval at each percentile point from the FF chance distribution. The solid heavy line denotes the 
CDF of the actual/(estimated) t(TM), the dashed and dotted line are the CDFs generated by the KTWW and FF chance 
distributions, respectively. 
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